Vertical Agreements Competition Law India

The Competition Act 2002 (Competition Act) is India`s most important vertical restriction law. In addition, certain sectoral laws (such as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act 1997, the Electricity Act 2003 and the Oil and Natural Gas Regulation Act 2006) allow specially created sectoral regulators to enforce rules to promote competition in their respective sectors, which may cover the regulation of vertical restrictions, particularly for telecommunications, electricity or oil and natural gas. The European Commission`s vertical restriction guidelines provide that vertical restrictions are generally less harmful than horizontal restrictions and can provide considerable flexibility in terms of efficiency gains in the market [6]. The European Commission („EC“) has occasionally interpreted the concept of „agreement“ to a large extent. In Bayer AG/. The Commission told the EC that a restriction under Article 101 needed to be reviewed so that the restriction in question would be the „agreement of will“ between two parties. There is therefore no need to enter into a written agreement between the parties. In addition, Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. The Commission has found that Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not provide for a distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements and applies to all agreements that distort competition in the market [339]. In addition, countries such as the United Kingdom and Singapore do not distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements. Unlike the vertical restrictions rules, the provisions of the Abuse of Dominant Position Act do not require, by law, that actual or potentially anti-competitive effects be proven or that efficiency gains are taken into account, while the behaviour of dominant firms is analysed. Although there have been some cases of an object-based approach (for example. B MCX Stock Exchange Ltd.

– Golds. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. – Ors., Belaire Owners` Association v. DLF Ltd. – Ors.), it appears that the ICC`s subsequent decision-making practices have anti-competitive effects resulting from dominant behaviour and that these are possible efficiency gains resulting from such conduct. The ICC`s assessment of market lockdown is an analysis of other factors such as the company`s position, which imposes vertical restraint, duration of restriction, etc. (see our response to question 2.8). When assessing vertical restrictions, the ICC often checks whether these restrictions are objectively necessary or justified (see our response to question 2.14). The ICC in Ghanshyam Dass Vij`s litigation assistance reviewed and rejected the allegations of territorial restrictions and the maintenance of an exclusive distribution system (see question 28), given that the supplier that imposed the restrictions did not have sufficient market power and that the presence of other players did not affect inter-brand competition in the fmCGCG sector. The restriction of the customer to which a buyer is authorized to sell a product may be prohibited as an „exclusive distribution agreement“ or „refusal of contract“ if this causes or is likely to be the cause of an AAEC in India. For example, Autopart`s CCI has sanctioned several OEMs for entering into vertical agreements with their dealers, preventing dealers from delivering original spare parts to third parties.